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IVllGt Wflre iJ. preliminary rutAlUf
I N the summers of 1942 and 1943. the brilliantyellow of spreading fields of sunflowers andrapeseed gave the countryside of the con·
tinent of Europe a new appearance. Once
looked down upon. thcse plants. in the modesty
of their deUlands upon the soil and the rich oil
content of their seeds, have become a typical
example of the change which was beginning to
make itself felt on the Continent. .Their com·
pulsory planting to make up for Europe's
shortage of vegetable and animal fats and oils
was part of the planned economy which had
already been tested in Germany and which the
German occupation forces brought with them
alter the Blitz campaigns of 1939, 1940, and
1941. In l''rance the oil-seed culture was in-
creased from 20.000 acres before the war to
one million acres in 1944; in Belgium. with
German seed, from 1,000 acres to 63,000 acres.
Of the 8,000 tons of fats distributed in No-
vember and December 1944 by the "liberators"
in Belgium. 6,400 tons came from this rapeseed
harvest.
Planned economics and strict rationing of raw
materials had rendered Germany independent
of imports during periods of crisis. When the
Anglo-Saxons included even their former allies
in their blockade, the expansion of these planned
economies to the entire European continent
represented the sole means of preventing
starvation and economic collapse. Crops har-
vested on the battlefields of yesterday began
to fill barns ,and storehouses. Manual and
industrial production got under way again.
The blockade was being countered by hard
work and planning. The day seemed not far
off when the peoples of Europe would amicably
join up their tables in a. common celebration of
thanksgiving.
Then suddenly a storm broke loose with the
invasion in the west and south a.nd east. With
the assembled force of three vast empires it;
swept up to the Rhine. the Po, and the Oder.
What had been an occupied Europe became a
"liberated" Europe. On the heels of the
Allied invasion armies there followed the
politicians of yesterday who began a. hectic
search for the threads which had been broken
off by their flight. But wherever they went
they met with something new. something they
had not expected when they abandoned their
countries in headlong flight. when they estab.
lished exile governments in Brown's Hotel in
London and while they hung about in the
a.ntechambers of Washington and Moscow.
Ah. who were the men who had offered
themselves for this devilish work of co-operating
with Germa.ny1 Down with the collaboration·
ists! Shots rang out faster and faster in the
yards of the oourthouses and on the streets.
The mouths of those had to be stopped who
had seen the truth a.nd dared to stand up for
it. The consternation of the returned politicians
and their masters over what had happened
during their absence waxed from day to day.
INTER-EUROPEAN ECONOMY
Ma.rs had ruled the hour. and military necee·
sity had to be the supreme law. It had often
been incomprehensible, irksome. heavy-banded.
Yet the harvests on the fields of Europe, its
industrial production in the years from 1939 to
1943, are a. monument to economio common
sense. Their sober statistics proclaim the
beginnings of a common European produotion
which justified new hopes for what had been
oonsidered an old and decrepit continent. '
Germany's foreign trade in the years 1939 to
1943 was discuased in detail in the Augustl
September 1944 issue of this magazine. In
1943 it amolHlted to almost 60 per cent more
than in 1938. the last year of peace. Germany's
exports had risen to over three times those of
Great Britain, which had-according to the
1943 White Book on Britain's war produotion
-shrunk to 29 per cent of the prewar loyel.
Germany even exceeded USA exports (excluding
Lend-Lease deliveries).
While England had to stop all iron a.nd steel
exports. and while her coal production could,
in spite of all her rich mines. no longer cover
her home consumption, Germany increased her
deliveries of iron and stool and even of that
most precious commodity of blockaded Europe.
grain a.nd seed, to an extent which amazed the
Allies. Moreover. she was able to do eo al-
though her transports bad to go by rail or
along the limited inland waterways of _Europe.
Italy alone had since 1940 received year after
year an annual quantity of twelve million tons
of coal from Germa.ny. In addition to this. in
order to save coal. initial work bad been started
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to extend Europe,s production of electric
power by exploiting /I\'lIilault· water power and
by un inter:'tlltc exchange of clcetrieit!'. Ger-
many p~ cd on her ~ueccs~ful III thods of
produetion lind the resnlt:; of her !']lecia.li'l.cd
research, aidcd the improvemcnt of com-
munications, and exported high-quality seed
IUlll cattle for brecding purposes,
Thu groat'r part of ElI1'opo's tnule, including
that uf the neutml countries, passed through
the clearing system in Berlin, a.'J did the remit-
tanee -2 billion Illarks in J!).tO/43-of the
millions of foreign laborers in (Jerruan.Y to their
home countries. By maintaining stable prices
n.t home n.ud in~i tina upon stable prices among
her European trade partners too, Germany
sought to safeguard Europe's commerce from
dangerous uphen,ylLls. Questions of price, for-
III r1y the object. of long disputes, were rnpirlly
solv 'd, n is proved by the signing of the
Gcrlmtn- Ihnish·Swedish·:Finnish timber aw-ee-
mont of I!H2, which e tablislH'd a secure market
at fixcd price for northern Europe llnd antic·
ipakd th Rolution of postwar problcms. The
quoH\'ion of tariffs and mOllt-favorcd-nationR
elttuses, thoge formerly so tenaciously defendcd
aUributes of It permanent economic war among
the nations, were almost entirely eliminnt,cd, lUI
thore is 110 need for slIch til ing:'! in the col·
laboration of a larg ccolloll1i: ilphere.
TWO Af.E·
"Dllring tho twcnties and thirties, ullC'mploy-
ment, a~ri 'lilt-ural distress, lack or plnlllling.
and printt.' monopolies in many pans of thl'
world "pon '01' d the world-wide economic crisiil.
'I'll",)' ,\Or.rn .·h" rli"'.inp;l1i,,hing ma.l'kl'! of til('
t1c1ining lib ralistic-capitaLi ti· era. While it",;
l'uprlJ)ft'lI~llt,I\'l'.~ \;VIUllll\U\.kJ • n-r th., i rr \lr.R
of the earth and plowed under cotton, burned
wh at, 11m I l,!lruw u(JfTlJ~ iuLv tile Ilel~, t,IIO.)"
hardly contributed unything toward removing
that serious cri is. With mix'd f lings they
looked toward the Soviet Union. There, tlll'y
said, tho capitalist Ryl:ltem hud been bronght to
its final culminating point anti the people sub-
jccted-bycollectivizl\tion and byt.he Liquidation
of all active or potential enemies-to the aimK
of the chief "shareholders" of tbe state, the
lea.ders of the Communist Party_ There the
problems of unemployment and social ume. I,
hatl been brilliantly sol\red by forced labor and
the GPU. There no ono dared to protest
agl\inst the dictates of the economic bosses.
In their own countries, t,he lord and masters
of capitalism fOltlld t,bings not quite so easy.
The great experiment of the Versailles Treaty,
with the motto: "Let the Germans pity," had
flLilcd. Tho obstructions placed in the way of
G rmany's re overy had a del, riorating influence
on the economic structure of the victor nations
themselves. While one international conference
followed upon another to deliberate Germany':;
abilit.y to pay and the growing dilliculties in
world ('('onomics, Germany rid hCl'~clf between
JU33-t he )'elu of the last, un ucces. ful wodd
economic conference in London-and JH:18 bv
her own ellort of aIL those scourges of he~r
economy, awakening it to new, stl'Ong life.
Sinco then a bitter war has ruged against
Xationul Socialism and nil related movement!!.
J ts enemies hflye mobilized evcrything in the
way of calumny, economic, political, anll
finally military pressure they could think of
again·t it. That the successful application of
• rational Socialist ideas in Germany could not
be prevented was bad enough, What was fUI'
worse was that in the war veal's of 1939 to
1944 the European continent ~eould Imbmit t.he
German economic methods to a test and achieve
resultJol with them which gave the natio/ls
concerned much food for thought. The peoplo
could not but remem ber conditioJls as they Ilud
been a few year previously, when Europe WIIS
confronted by armies of starving unemployed
us well as acres of untilJ d field and rich eonl
mincs that had been shut, down. It. was unlv
the discarding of the prewar mentality whicit
put llgricnltu.rul and industrial production on
its feet again; and it was the tragic turn of futu,
not l:crmany' wish, that the fruits of thili
production served war rather thun peace.
The results uf Frallco-German collaboration
after the armistice of Junc }U40 deservc partic-
ular attcntion, as there was little prewar foundu-
tion un which it coult.! be built lip and had to
take into account the initial tf'llllion between a
defeated, spiritulllly collapsed natior. Gud iI,s
victor, The work of Mn,I'shal Petain and the
men around him will be judgNi properly one
<i,,:.', when i h.. wnr.time f"g of hntrf'r1 ha!~
blown away.
Tho Compiogno nrmi8ti"o IlIlel laid It Rnvprn
but elenr foundation fol' Illutual co-operation.
The cost: of occupation were fixed precisely.
The L'erman demand for their pa'ym~IIL \;vr-
relipolllied to international law. Even the
liberators of France have resorted to this right
since the invasion, thus admitting them ·lve8
that their action reprcsent-s nothing but an
occupation. As for the payments Germany
received to defray her occupation costs, theil'
major part was used to pay for goods and
services in Fra.nee. Accordingly, confidence in
the French currency remained unshaken until
the invading Allies brought thoir own blLlIk
notes and put them into circulation.
The central problems confronting the oc-
cupation power and the P6tain Government
were the restoration of the system of com-
munications and an increa.~e of agricultural
production. While the campaign was still being
fought, the German armies had been followed
by the columns of the Toot Orgallizlltion which
had begun to rebuild highways and bridges and
to make the cllnals na\rigable again. 1~43 saw
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8n almost peace·tillle train en'icc and a. travel-
iug boom.
A hundred years ago. France was /1, great
agricultural nation until, swept up by the
capitalist trend and dn.zzled by her colonial
wealth, she 11,1l0wcd her agriculture to decline
far below tho standard of her neigh boring
countries, both as regards its social condition
lmd its production. Marxism, so powerful in
1·'rance, also had little sympathy for the farmer
and the rural worker, as Karl Marx had entirely
ignored this class in his plans of World Rev-
olution. There was not even an organization
to represcnt the interests of the rural classes
in France. Hence the creation of un agricul-
tural union was one of the first reforms carried
out after the armistice.
Before tho war, l~rance im ported 12 billion
francs' worth of foodstuffs annually, chiefly
from her North African colonies. 1\ow her
population. had to feed itself off her own soil,
first ill part and la.ter entirely, when, as a result
of the invasion of North Africa by the Americans
in 1942, sbe lost the colonies and merchant
ships left to her in the armistice. Tho measures
undertaken by the milit,ary authorities were
hence aimed ubove all at safeguarding l'''ranco's
food supplies by fully exploiting the soil, tho
labor resources, and all the meRns of production.
All available tractors were converted to wood-
gas fuel. Thousands of carloads of agricultural
implements, cattle, horses, and seed rolled to
France from the Reich. The result,s were prom-
ising. The wheut harvest of Ill-la amuunted
to 1:i.5 million tons, surpassing that of lU42 by
one miJIion tOJll:!. 1"01' l!).l4 it was expected
tha.t sufficicnt brend, potatoes, ami vegetables
would be produced in Franco to cover all her
needs. In order to improve storage facilities,
1,000 new silo:! were built, in 1943 alone. Ex-
tensive measures were undertaken to kCE'p
illsect pests in check, more than 130,000 sprays
wing dil;tributed for use against the potato bug.
1';0 mueh flax wa.'! grown that in I \:143 the Belgiau
industry had to help use up the crops.
France having before the war imported 20 to
t5 miilion tons of her allDual coal rClluirements
of 70 to 75 million tons, the German coal sup-
plies became ind ispensable for the gelting under
way of France's industry. Among the many
otlter important mw materials imported from
Germany was also cellulose, needed for the
ra.pidly cxplmding staple-wool production. In
order to improve the supply of pOWl'L', jll'Ojects
were drawn up for the exploit,ntion of Fmnce's
rich water- power resources. r\ mong them the
attempt to exploit the huge forcel; of the Mont
Blanc f!lacier. desen"es attention for it original-
it,y. \'lhile J'fllncc had more than half a mil-
lion unelnfJloypd before the war, a perceptible
short.age of lalJor made itlSclf felt dming the
last few years. German)' could not allow
prisoncrs of war to return en masse to l~ranee
because she IUld to consider the pO::lsibility of
France bccomillg a bat tlefield and mobilizing
once more against Germany. Howe\-er, ..he
changed t,be status of I1Illlly prisoners into that
of civilian laborers.
Gradually France re-entered European trade
as a sovcn,jgn part,Iwr. In J!)43, for example,
she concluded a commercial treaty with Den-
mark, which provided for machillery, fil;h, and
pharI1laceutical products to be shipped from
Dennlllrk and machinery, spices, perfume,
liqucurs, and wine to be sent from France,
which, incidentally, hows t,hat France con-
tinued t,o manufacture these prewar specialitie6
of hers.
Six Inonths after the invasion, Frcderick
Cmwford, tho presidellt of tho VI'; MIUllIfa<ltur-
ers' Association, returned home from an exten-
sivo trip through France. To the amazement
of his countrymen, he roported that France
had experienced a period of national prosperity
under the German occupation, with excellent
working conditions llud adeq uato wages. In
the years from 1941 to I!H4, he said, }'rench
agriculture had enjoyed llll unprecedented
boom, and French industry had been support,ed
on a large scale by Germn.ny.
BELOIUM
BelgiuIll and Hol1aml constitute special
CRses. They were colonial powers, whose pre-
war economy was based on close tics between
t he mother eOllntry ami the colonies. Cut off
from their colonies sillce the outbreak of war,
they Illul completely to rcvil'!e their economic
system if they did not witih to starve. The
German cOIUmander in chief in Belgium re-
garJed it as his chief taRk imIIIediately aftel'
the occupation to sec that the agricultural
aumini);trat.ion co.operated closely with the
Farmers' League in order to obtain the neces·
sary food for the Belgian people from Belgian
soil.
Before the war, Bclgium import.ed 1,073,000
tons of wbeat (home productioll: -1-23,000 tons)
and 45,000 tons of rye (hom' p!'Oduction: :H5,000
tons). Her wheat import was greater than that
of Germany. The blockndo might have had lL
disastrow~ effect on a coulltry so dependent
on imports. But the wor·t wa prevented by
rations. prohibition of fccding grain to cattle,
and It)' increasing tho whelLt and rye acreage
in t.he years l!)40 to IIH3 f!'Olll ,50,000 to
1,125,000 lleres, that of potatoes from 200,000
to :300,000 acres. As l.l result of t1lese measureR,
the proport,ion of Belgian hOl1le production ill
her food su pplies rO::le to an extent never
t,hought po' 'ihlc before. Xe\"ertheless, there
still rcmained a deficiency which had to be
covered by :-upplies from Europeall surplus
regioIU!, chiefly southeastern Europe. Cerma.ny
delivercd 400,000 tons of groin in the first
year and from 40,000 to 100,000 tons in each
of the following ycars. Belgium paid wit.b
indul:ltrilll products aud chemica.ls.
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In addition to this promotion of agriculture,
all extensive reconstruction program was carrit'd
out which howed the following rcsults after
two years :
-l.G per cent of damultorl ruotorie~working again
7 .3 .. slightly uUlOagcJ hOUJlCll repairOll
56. U., ft badly tt ..
48.0.. .. dsmag>d rouds repaired
20.7.. .. complotely destroyed houses rebuilt
A large proportion of this dalllage was not
iJlflicted during the short weeks of the German
t:I1lll paign but through the ubscq uent years of
.\lIied air raid.
Thi'" work of reconstruction, and the reo
cruiting of lubor for Germuny (for which 250.000
lielgian workmen had upplied by January
l!).l2). also ditl awuy with unemployment,
whieh had been rampant before the war. In
the social sphere the Winter H.elicf work or·
ganized on tho German patt,em proved 80 great
u success that it survived the extirpation of all
other Gcrman organizations after the invasion.
llULL:\ND
Before the war the German market had
been prepared to buy up the entire available
production of the highly specialized Dutch
agricult,ure and cattle raisulg. But it was
prc\'ent.cd from doing so because Holland
would not accept the corresponding amount of
Gcrman industrial product in exchange. In·
I:ltca.d, the Dutch turned to the Engli h market.
tiut exports to England requ.ired GO\-ernment
1mbventions, since the English puid low prices.
the Dutch products having to compete with
tho'c from the British domulions and colonies.
The result wus that in part the ri h han-e ts of
Holland simply perished, as they could be
neither exported nor bought by the Dutch
population because of the high domestic prices.
'0 Holland, too, required a radical readjust.
mont. It was rendered more difficult by the
fact that the Dutch themselves hnd destroyed
the basi8 of their communications. the canal
system. with its many bridges, and had flooded
large areas without. however, having "topped
the German advance. With the aid of German
sappers, the entire flooded areas were drained
within three weeks; the ships that had been
8unk to bar the waterways were rem0 \Ted , and
hundreds of bridges were built. The land rec·
lamation undertaken by the Dutch Govern·
ment was continucd in spite of difficulties
arising from the war. 40,000 acres of land
were recluimed in 194.2, mainly in the Zuider
Zee.
The Dutch population was put on exactly
the same food rations as the Germans in thc
Heich, all deficiencies being made up for. By
changing over t.o a more \-egetable diet, the
Dutch were able by 194-1 t.o feed themselvcs off
their own soil.
The elimination of unemploylllent, which
wealthy prewar Holland with her vast colonial
empire had not been able to aohieve, became
a fact by 1942 as the result of Holland's in·
c1usion in the economics of Europe as n whole_
One contributing factor was the plneing of
orders with Dutch industry, for which Germany
supplied an annual average of thrce billion
marks' worth of raw materials. A new ocial
insurance sy-·tem was introduced which went
far beyond anything exist,ing in rich prewar
Holland. While compensation used to be paid
only for the 10. of wages resulting from sick-
ne ,all expenses incurred by sickne nre now
covered, and the participation of family memo
bers ill also being considcred. Old-age in-
surance rates were increased. and special tax
legislation was passed to benefit HolIuml'l'l
large number of big families.
DESMARK
Denmark and Norway had also built 1IJ1
their economic system on factors lying outside
their countries: Denmark on the export of
high.grade farm products. Norway on her mer-
chant marine. Both were bard hit by the
outbreak of war.
Bcfore the war. Danish farm product-s were
sold chiefly in the English market. There
these products, like the Dutch ones. met with
stiff competition, so that Danish butter was 1\
good deal eheaper in Englund than i'n Den-
mark, a large proportion of the Dane" havin'
to eat cheaper margarinc instead. With till'
occupation of Denmark by German troops, II
radical chauge set in in her economic 8ystem.
By joining the economic system of Europe us
a whole. Denmark became one of t.he most,
popular trade partners of the Continent. She
concluded commercial treaties with thirteen
countries, the smallest of which amounted to IL
few million and the largest-with Germauy-
to two billion kroner, and which in many case"
provided for the exchange of peace.time prod-
ucts. In 194-l, Denmark had an average
monthly export surplus of some 15 million
kroner (in 1943: G million kroner). Coal sup-
plies which had formerly come from England
wcre now undertaken by Germany. At the
sa·mc time, a detailed study of her own resources
showed that the lignite deposits on Jutland
amount to some 15 million tons. By 194.3
Dcnmark's peat production had risen t.o 4.
million tons, i.e., twch-e times the prewar
average. Systematic drilling led to the dis-
covery of natural gas, which supplied 1.1
million cubic meters of chemical gus in two
years.
Thc maUl wealth of Denmark's agriculture,
her cattle stock, amounted in 1939 to 3.3
million head. among them 1.6 million milcb
cows; it had. however, been largely dependent
on imported fodder. By an intensification of
fodder cultivation at home, the livestock which
had temporarily diminished could by 1943 be
brought to about 3 million bead again. To
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make up for the deficiency in imported fodder,
t" carbohydrates contained in cellulose have
been made u e of. The cows arc fed ct'llulosc
ill t hc form of grayish·white cardboard, Similar
('xl)Criments were also maue in 'weden, the
IIt'W fodder being given the name of "wood
"lit. ," In rcply to thc blockade, the cultiva·
t iOIl of various crops wa. encouruged. The
lIllX a 'reage was increased from 2,500 acres
h('for the war to 75.000 acres in HI4-4. Tho
whunt crop rose by 50 per cent from 1942 to
1\14:.1, that of air·uried tobacco from 700,000
kilo~ram (\tI42) to 2,5 million kilograms (lUH).
III I!H2, communal taxes could be reduced
ill Copenhagen, us the city budget no longer
I'cI(llired millions of krouel' for uncmploymellt
rl'1ief. (JovcrJlment finances for the year H)42/
4:.1 closeu wit h a surplu!<, as uid the postal
find telellraph adlllini tration. Agricultural
profit,s increased in lU42 by 13 to 14 pel'
cent in the case of smull farms, 20 to 30 per
('\'lIt in the case of medium·sizeu farms, as
(.'umpflred to prewar timos. The tUUlual avernge
J'rofits of Dunish uluustry amounted in 193
t" 11.2 per cent, in 1942 to 10.7 per cent of
t he invested capital. This means that, although
II excessive war profits were made, an ade<luate
ill{'ome was ensuroo. There was room left for
lIew investments, and in IB43 the first Danish
l'tecl works were establisheu with a capacity of
4U,OOO tons. National income rose to such an
('xtent that, in order to prevent an inflation,
It"gi.lation had to be passed in 1944 to freeze
J. \J billion kroner.
1ncidentaIly, the ranks of Da.nish millionaires
wure swelled in 1941/42 by 23. But this trend
wn not only charack'l'i1ltic of the upper eco·
nomic strata. People of all walks of life had
tlO much time and money for amusement that,
with unchltnged rates, the revenue from enter·
tainment tax rose {rom l3.2 million kroner in
1\J43 to 1j.G million kroner in 1944.
:tWIlW.o\Y
Norway hll.d suffercd badly from the war on
her soil. Her merchant marine, one of her
principal sources of income, was being used
almost entirely by the Allies. But as soon as
act,ual warfare ended, reconstruction waoS begun.
]n 'Major Vidkun Quisling the country found a
(( arless cham pion of Norwegian.German col·
laboration. As Torwegian milita.ry attache in
the SSR and close collaborator of Fritjof
Nan 'en, Quisling had obtained deep insight
into the Bolllhevist system. One of Nansen's
collaborators, he had worked in the famine
di t ricts of the Soviet Union, where millions
of peasants perished.
4.038 kilometers of railway lines and GO
iJril1ges totaling 3,595 meters in length, which
hnd been ucstroyed during the campnjgn, were
(]uickly rebuilt. To improve flulway com·
lllunications, Germany supplied 1,000 flat cars
and many locomotivc3 of the latest type up to
the miudle of 1943.
In Norway, too, Germany became the largest
trade partner.
Norwa~"8 Trade (in million ReichslOnrk)
Jmporl.'l fr01l1 Germany li'zporllJ 10 G'emla'IY
10:.18 130 0
Ion 500 230
This placed Norway's supply of foodstuffs a.nd
indu trial products on a. sound footing. In
194:1,44, import!! from Germany cOllsisteu majn·
Iy of graUl, fodder, coal, and lI~riculturnl
machinery. E\'ery second slicc of hrenu con·
sumcd, :10 per cent of all sugar, and 30 per cent
of 1111 fats, were imported f om Germany.
Norway's fishing indu:ltry 1I0W workcd for
the practically unlimited continental market
and the majority of the fishermen earned lieveral
time ll,8 much IlS the)' did in pellce time. With
the nid of the new rapid.freezing methods aud
other modern cold· storage facilities, a new
epoch WIlS initiated in the fishing industry.
Instead of dried fish, Norway could export
higher. priced fresh fish, frozen fish, and fish
fillet8. Seaweed, which is rieh in vitamin C,
is being used as fertilizer and mixed with
fodder. It also serves as the raw material for
soap and rayon. The' plentiful lichen, which
contain much starch, are, after removal of the
bitter substances, sold like leaf gelatine.
F L"'I.A.'i 0
In her struggle for existence against Bolshe-
vism, :Finland reccivoo Germany's full support.
What she needed more than anything else
was food, for .Finland coulu only cover her
own rC<luirements if she were to extend her
cultivated land several times, which was not
possible under the prevailulg conditions of war.
Accordingly, the Oerman·:Finnish trade agree·
JUent provided less for exchange quotas than
for a (Jerman guarantee to cover the Finnish
deficiency. In the agreement signed in the
autumn of 1942, for instance, Germany under.
took to supply I~in1and with all foodstuffl:!
she lacked for the fiscal yenr 1942/43. AB a
result, }'inllish bread rations could be raised to
the German level. In llH3, j5 per cent of
Finland'l:! import.s and (jj per cent of her exports
were taken care of by Germany. Denmark
followed in second place, and Sweden came
third in imports, Italy in exports. In the same
year the acting }'innish Mini tel' of Trade and
Industry could declare that Finland's foreign
trade was in a considernbly more favorable
position than in peace time.
The ce. ation of German food supplies after
tho conclusion of the Finno·Sovict armistice
was II. heary blow to Finlllnd. Her bread ra.-
tions had to be cut in half, and her meat rations
became inadequate and irregular. Added to
all other difficulties, a factor of the capitalist
epoch made its appearance again which had
disappea,red almost entirely among the European
19! THE XXth CEl\T "R Y
nations during the war yeur«: the Soviets in-
'rcas d tlto !·'umiJ5h import tariffs by 200 per
"n I th by i olating th oc 'upied country
from i form r trade paJ'tller-.
1I "WAltY
The 0 onomic developrllcnt of the Balkan
states within the framework of Europ an
economics uuring the war was dealt with ill the
article "Tit BctLkan Cal<1ron" (February 11)45).
We lnlJ nly add 0. hort table tihowing the
way in whi h the economic mterlacing of
central and southeastern Europe was progrcti-
sing:
Southeastern European Trade
(in million R icllJlmluk)
Import' from Gerr/l{IIIY Jo:rporlS to Germally
1033 435 32i
J9311 1,040 1,09i
1940 1,34-1 1,40·l
I11H 1,3H 1,3i2
194.2 1,81.i2 2,020
In the on 0 of two southeastern European
conutrie , Hungary and 'Io\'akia, which uo not
belong to tho Balkan and were not diticusscd
in the above-mentioned article, economic prob-
lem nrc diff I' nt from tlto e exi ·tmg in westcrn
and northern Europe.
In order fully to exploit the great possibilitics
of a.gricultural exports to European countries
durin tit war as well as in normal times,
Hungary b d ubstantially to increase the area
under cultivation and to ill tell'ih' hcr a ricul-
uraJ m th Is. For Uti purpo e: large quanti·
tie of hi :rh.qua.lity seed, imported in part hom
rmany, were distributed, for the YCllrs 1!1.12J
43 al n· 1.0 million hUllllrcdweight; hun Ircds of
thou and of shoots were also distributed for
the cultimtion of fruit and wine. Tb com-
pulsory ulti ation of indu trilll crops included
m . cd, 'a tor oil, rubL I' plant., sugar
beet, anu tobacco. New ngricult1ll'ul vi ttl
war op n'd up wit,h the init,iation of rice
cultivation in the I'll sta, which offered good
climatic and s il condit,ioll .
Hun~urlun Trade (in million Hci"h"mnrk)
Import4 from (,' rmu1IY 1,'rporI4 10 (; rlllany
193 100' HjO
19t3 6~0 6jU
The e figures strikingly show the lJenelits
derived L lho two trade pllI'tners all a rpsult
of mutual adaptation to each other's require-
ments. nd I' the impul c of these im[lro\'\;-
men' , Hun ary, like Denmark, became one of
the mo t s u ht-after trad' partners in Europe.
Not the I ust attraction was l,h faet t,hnt sho
has al 0 ril; 'n to sixt,h place among t,ho tobacco
;eroduc r of th world and i~, next to Bulgaria,
Eur pe larg t tobacco. upplier. III HI-t:i the
toba co cr p amounted to 23,220,000 kilo-
gram
Th in the ,\lurr tcrritol'\',
the which waH lJeguil,
and, a.bov all, tho diseovl~ry of 1J1I.uxite
deposit nCllr Budapest which rivaJ thc large t
in Europe ,in sizc, gave an additional irnpctl1:3
to Hungary's economic, Projects for the
development of hydroelectric plant: on tho
Danube at the Iron Gatc, and eh.ewbel'l', were
got ~der way.
tlLOYAKIA
Slovakia, though only a timall stale, has
clearly ctitablished her right to independence ill
the family of European nation by ("\'011 exccod-
ing the expectatiolls placed on hcr future at
the time of the declaration of her ind('pend 'nee
in I 93!:l. Having already laid the foundations
for o.grieulturaJ self-lHlllicieIley before the war,
her agriculture experienced a war boom which
was made possible by regular large 8U pplies of
agricultural machinery and seed, crude oil, and
coal from Germany, The sale of aU agricultural
aUlI indu trial surplu'es was as ur d, while
under tho old European economic 8yst-em a.
st,nte like Slovakia could hardly lJave found
new markets.
On the third anniversary of indcpendence,
Siovakia'ti leader Ti 0 was able to a :lert that,
during those three yea fl'! , more publi works-
road building, railway building, soil amcliora-
tion, electriflcation-llad been undertaken thall
in tho twenty years of Czecb rule. The Todt
Orga,nizatioll had rendered great services ill
thiti conncction, and Germany had lent a help-
ing hand by "upplying locollloti\'ef', Ilutomobilc,""
and othcr /Ilean of transport, Xew branches
of indll try were found d, including the
manufa turo of cellulo'e and synthet,i fiber'.
Since the country'!:! independence, its industry
invested 2.5 billion kronen for new eonlltl'llct,ion
llnd exton ion, NatiOlml income I' se from
IO.\J Lillion krollcn (1!'30) to 19.7 billion kwncn
(19H) with fairly tabl pric(s. Out of ~lova­
kia's ....4' billion kronclI of import in 1\)·1:3,
2.n billions came frolll (:erlllall\', \\'hile :! ..:i
billions Ollt of her 4.41.1 billions of ·export., \\'ent
there,
In the Illultiplicity of individual t,rait, III
these d ·yclopment:-t ho short enurn mtion of
whi h give no more t,han a. hint of t,h' gn·a.t
difficulties that had to bo ovcl'l:omc-thc
fundalllent.al principles of !'\at,ional •'ocillli8t
eeonolll in! arc clearl y re\'cal d :
In for('ign trade: t.he ui 'tribution of produc-
hon among the Eurap an nation' for thl' pllr-
posc of achic\'ing thc most, favorablo reslllts, as
well a.s l,hl' principle of rcciprocity (buy frulll
your cutitomer!).
In dorne::!t,ic ecollomiet<: (I) a carcful weighing
of aU economic pos'ibilitil's, adju!'ting plan,' uf
produetion according to th tiC pOS. ibilitie~ \\'hile
fully taking into aceoullt t he demand:! of pcriod:!
of cri is and distrcf'f'. (Z) All-enl'ornpas:ing
market and price reglllations which lI1ake
possilJle 011 tbe one hand a, profitablo produc-
tion and adcfluat-e wage pUylll('nts, 011 the othcr
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lL j lJ I, di ·tributi II. (3) Work a th moral
ubligatioll of every individual all I an obligat.ioll
vII the purl, of tue tate to prc\'('lIt ullelllploy.
ilIOn t.
:\11 thi~ docs 1101, ollly sound rea'onable ami
"illlpl': it. hn been put into 'uC'C' 'ful practice
ill almo,-t. Il t.he state of th EILropcan COli·
t.illlJllt durillg tho last few yeur. in spite of
wa.r·timc reslriclioll and varyin' condit.ion in
thu diff'rellt. eountrie, the principle:> ha\"
proved th('m 'elves to b stimulants for strong
pl'Oducti\'c forces a.nd guarantors again t stan·a·
Lion ami 'haos. How v('r, tho d lar d object
uf the Allies in the present war is their per·
llIancnt cxtirpati n. A sel1sible order based on
t h • principle' has two irr 'oncilable op-
pUllents: capitnli m, which rrgards tho coming
into existence of a Gro 'smwn organizt:d /lccord·
illg to non 'apitalistic principles a a threat to
i t..'\ proll tl:! /lnd power; /lnd Bolshcv i m, wh icb
lIeeds social strife, ullemployment, lLnd cia'
Illltred for its growth and COli cquently fcar'
t 110 ri c of a cont.inent·widc economic system
bascd on collaboration and aiming a.t the welfare
of all.
But h w wa it po iblo t.hat, 0 clo"e 10 the
great thanksgi\'illg day, such wide circles in
Illan.y European countries wrre lon'ing for
V.day, altholl h they w('re not. ubi, to lip.
1'1' 'HS a fe ling of ul1easine .s toward liberation
hy t.b Hed Army? (Incidentally, were the e
('in'leil a wide a the liberators r1nim? Did
t II<'y form a Ol/ljurit.'", ll' good d'lll cratie pro·
,·('tlur would rcquil' i Wby all the collabom·
1ioni t. trinl", to wh ich th '1' ems to be no end')
In a Icmpting to an weI' this que tion, w·
"/lllI1ul, ignore the underground nIU\'('lllcnt:;,
wh: bold pirit und personal sacrifice haye
ue 'n prni,;; d tiO highly. l'ndoubtedly t.h 1'0
weI" idcnlii'ts in their ranks, umong the Maquiti
lind t.h· parli un g-roup. of ey ry nation. But
t hc'ir militarv valuc wa neither d ei i\'c nor
intlii'pensabl~for the ..-\lIies. In close eo·opera·
t.jon with tho Brit.ish scerel, srrvi c und with
](.l'd agenl.H, thr.\' had in reality u f(uile differenL
/lnd far more irnportant tll"k to fulfill: it. \vu.::!
up 10 t.11I'rn lu I'l'ey(A nl, the colluboralion of th ir
eounl.rynll'n \l'Ilh the (; I'm It occnpalion IIU·
I huritil'''. to illlped the funl'tioning of tue
:\Tlttional 'ocialiHt. l'eolllJJllie prineiplr" on a
l·ontil\('nt·wide Hcale. \\'hal1'\'('r "11l'CCSS t he\'
had n h It'II(·I'(1. un Ihe OIH' hand, to th fr
IIPI' al to Ihe hl'1'itage of hislol'Y. th ' t!lau\·in·
iSIIl of the I ('oples; on Ihe uther. 10 th fa t
tllld., in spitt' of (: rrnan eITortH to reduce the
dillicult i HIlri"ing frolll thr Will', Ihese diflicullief!
('ould not be entin'l)' eliminaled lind were
1,lalllcd on (:('rrnan\·.
~uw th' (:erlllll~l troops Illwe withdra\\-n
from larg urea. 'tarvution an I I litic'ul con·
fusion arc spread ing in t hc foot. tep~ f th
Alli d in\'usiou armie.s and arc gi\'ing ris to
fears for the fulur of the 'ontinrn if (; rllluny':
str 'nglh :huuld prove uncqual to the aHsault
from all 'ide. The "Iiberatioll" has IIOW al'o
eOllfrunted tlte Allied ide with "ollie of th·
ba::lie problems uf Emop un eeollomic.. The
trnntliliull from the (:ermfln "y'l 'm of Eur pean
ec nomic 10 the Angl . 'axon one of world
economic is proving fur more diffi'll1t (.)11111
the Allies had expected. Cnemployment is
ri 'ing from week to we k. In I!1·IO, the (: I'm n
ecollomic poliey nw to It rapid ineor]l mtion of
we ·t.ern Europe's production into Iltc ('ntir'
European 'phere and abolishcd unempllymellt
almo I, o\'ernight. But as Englllnd and t.hu
Ullited States are not n. uniform ecullomi'
sphere to which wesl rn Furop could b
linked organically, western Europe repn',,('ntin~
ill t.heir e.ves Jlll'l't'ly u tilly H('dor of world
economic", tht'v he"itate to conclude I rude an L
clearing agree~lCnt ; for they fire afraid of all
unfavorablo etT ct on I,ho jJominions alld otuel'
parts of the world whi h might re:ult fro III
exclu iye advantage' cOlltain d in su u agr
mellt.s for wc tern Europe.
G nuany \Va. able to interloek her e nomic
organizution with that of the 'upied e untric'
b 'eau e she let herself bo lell by a Ellropellll
cri rion. Tbi is not pos'iule in till' 'nse f
the Anglo· 'axon', as their economic )loti(·)' i.
eOllduct d from Lhe pt,int of "iew uf world
ec nomics. As for tbe. 'o\'ict", Ihe I 'opll's who
fall under their control ha\'c nu nlt('rnllti\'e 1m
to be swullowcd up by the Bobhl'\'ist C 'onomi '
. ystelll, which Illcun.s producing for purpo. es
for('ign to their o\\-n int I' ·t .
• • •
The lib mlOl'R of Europe huve brollght. 110
gifl' for their friends on the Contimnt. JII·
st ad, Ihry ha\' ran. a 'ked :torehollsl'S fllld
stocks a 'eutDuJated in collahoml iOIl wit h (;('1"
many. What th('y do not nccd for tIH'llIse!\'e",
th'y halld out with fals generosily. As tIlt,..
sture.s llrc being u.sed II p. louoe/' (I nd IOlldrr crif's
for food ure rni:>cd. ,. Did not the );/lzis g1'llw
'ullflow 'rs ami rapc:<e d~ Hund 0\'('1' Ihe oil .,
com ,- th order frolll nbQ\'c. Fearful of Iwing
pro '('cutcd as ('ollilborat iuni,,!,.. IhI' 11'11,,1 eH Ul"
delivering up the 11IsI n'l!t'f\' s of uil to 1he I cw
go\'('rnnlcllt,., \\hich the latt T rnti n ou 10
tu grulldJlin r pO[lulu e,
It i a 10n<1 lime sinc I h Inst rC/l1 hal'\,(' t
Ihunk 6i\·ing. "\\'hen will Ihe nex on I .~"
is the allxious qllestion in (\'l'rybody's mind.
The 'ovi'l: ar ke pillg an icy silpn . '. Thl'
repli . gl\' U by t he An ,Io'~l\xun all .llllOUII
to onc Ihing Illy: postponed ind tillitely.
•
q;efinition
From raris lllst we k cam B n w d ullition of B eollub rali I\i~l:
"Anybody who eolloborowd more Ulan )'Oll did." (7'im)
